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Abstract. We present a model of the IEEE 1394 Root Contention Protocol with
a proof of Safety. This model has real-time properties which are expressed in
the language of the event B method: first-order classical logic and set theory.
Verification is done by proof using the event B method and its prover, we also
have a way to model-check models. Refinement is used to describe the studied
system at different levels of abstraction: first without time to fix the scheduling
of events abstracly, and then with more and more time constraints.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a model of the IEEE 1394 Root Contention Protocol with a proof
of safety and of real-time properties. We already described the pattern of our model of time,
applied in a simple case study, in Cansell et al. (2007) as a pattern of refinement for the event
B method. We show here how this pattern works over a proven development of the IEEE case
study. Many different models for real-time already exist. Our goal is to find a model of time
adapted to make proof by invariant with refinement over systems of events. We also argue that
is better to start a proven development by an abstract model without time and to use refinement
to add real-time properties. Therefore our model of time must allow us to use refinement.
The IEEE 1394, also known as FireWire, is used to connect devices like external hard-disks
or movie cameras. Devices are able to configure themselves by the IEEE 1394 leader election
protocol. This protocol takes the network as an acyclic graph and orients edges to obtain a
spanning tree rooted by a leader. This general case is already done with the event B method
in Abrial et al. (2003). This work extends this result to the following case: at the end of the
algorithm, or when only two devices are connected, the general algorithm can fail. In this
case the signals can cross in the bi-directional channel between the two devices if they send
signals at almost the same send time. Consequently the IEEE 1394 Root Contention Protocol
takes place in order to choose a leader between the two devices. The algorithm is probabilistic
and uses a random choice between a short and a long waiting time. This sleeping time and
signal sending between devices leads to a (probable) election. We can see this illustrated in
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Fig. 3 on page 9. We do not take into account probabilistic properties (we replace them by
non-determinism) nor the loss of signals. To model this system we need to quantify the two
different sleeping times and the progression of signals over the channels. We want to prove
safety properties on this algorithm and we want to be compatible with the existing B model
(Abrial et al. (2003)) in the general case. Furthermore, we want to use the language and tools
of B without modifications.
The language of the B method is based on the first order classical logic with set theory.
This method can be used to specifying, designing and coding software systems. B models of
system are accompanied by mathematical proofs. Proofs validate an invariant over the events
of the system and validate the refinement relation between models. The goal of the refinement
is to connect an abstract specification to a more concrete model. And step by step we can reach
a precise model of the implementation. A description of the event B method can be found in
Cansell and Méry (2003) or a shorter introduction is present in the section 2 of Abrial et al.
(2003). Of course, in this paper, every formal descriptions are followed by textual explanations.
The language of the B method does not contain specific real-time or distributed features
but we can model them. The idea is to guard events with a time constraint like a timeout or an
alarm. We say that events are linked to an “activation time” (AT). We have several sets of AT,
one for each constraint timed event which corresponds to encoding a multiset of ATs.
To represent the real-time progression we use a global clock represented by the variable
time. Our time is discrete so time ∈ N, but we can use unknown constants or logical expres-
sions between different times. The time progression is expressed by an event called tick_tock.
No events except tick_tock make the time progress therefore several events can trigger in
the same clock granule. This event nondeterministicly increases the variable time between
time + 1 and the first activation time (if any). So we have in invariant: (at 6= ∅ ⇒ time ≤
min(at)) where the variable at is the union of all different AT sets. As time is a natural
number we are sure that the system will reach the next active time if tick_tock is activated
often enough. Finally, when time reaches an AT value we have time ∈ at; in other words,
time = min(at). Therefore the event linked to this AT can trigger, do its work and remove
the reached AT from its AT set. After this suppression, time is free to reach the next AT, or
simply increase if at = ∅.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, 3, 4 and 5 we show the model of the case-
study. We follow the methodology of refinement and we introduce respectively: the goal of the
system, the details of the system without time, the real-time properties of the signals passing
and the real-time properties of the sleeping times. In Section 6, we show the verification of the
model. Finally in Section 7, we show related-work and we conclude.
2 First Model
This first model is the most abstract specification of our system. The general behaviour is
to choose (elect) one device in the set N = {a, b}. The only variable leader is a subset of N
and contains the chosen device (if not empty). Apart from this, the invariant states that the set
leader is {a} or {b} or ∅.
Finally the transitions of this abstract system are given by the event accept in Fig. 1. This
event occurs when the set leader is empty and fills it with a device. All of the following models
in the paper will refine this behaviour.
J. Rehm and D. Cansell
accept =̂
ANY x WHERE
x ∈ N ∧
leader = ∅
THEN
leader := {x}
END
FIG. 1 – Accept event FIG. 2 – Devices and channels
3 First Refinement
We now introduce, through refinement, the local state of devices and two communication
channels between device a and b. Almost all behaviour of the system can already be expressed
abstractly at this level of abstraction. Communication will be asynchronous. In other words
a signal from a to b can cross a signal from b to a. So the system can progress in two ways:
if only one signal is sent, a leader will be elected; if two signals cross, a situation called
“contention” will appear. In this situation the election is impossible, so the two devices will
remove their signals. After a contention the devices wait for a random length of time before
retrying the election process. We note that real-time properties will be added later and that
model is a specification for the future real-time properties. For example, we will add a precise
propagation time for the signal progress in a channel.
Devices communicate with two SIGNALS: IDL and PN . IDL is a blank signal. PN
(for Parent Notify) means that the sender does not want to be the leader. We have four dif-
ferent STATES for the two devices a and b, devices are in the state: reset when they start;
sending when they are sending the signal PN ; sleeping when they wait after a contention;
and accepting when they accept to be the leader. In the refinement, the variable leader disap-
pears through data refinement and we add nine new variables: variables a_state and b_state
for devices and three variables for each channels a_in, ab, b_out and b_in, ba, a_out. (The
names of variables are chosen with the intuition that the signal go into the channel, not outside
the devices). We need three variables for a channel because we want asynchronous commu-
nication and we can have a maximum of two changes of signals at the same time. The three
variables of a channel act in a “first in first out” way and we have an event to make the values
progress inside the channel from the input to the output. Finally, the variable case does not
take place in the behaviour of the system but is used to denote a special case in the invariant.
We can see a graphical representation in fig. 2, which shows the very first sending of the signal
PN .
3.1 Invariant
The first point to specify in an invariant is the type of the new variables: all variables of the
channels are members of the set SIGNALS; Variables a_state and b_state are in STATES;
and case is a boolean.
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In this refinement the variable leader is not required anymore because we can deduce the
leader of the election from the state of the devices. So we can replace the abstract variable
leader by the concrete variables a_state and b_state. We call this a “data refinement”. For
this we need a “gluing invariant” that relates the value of the abstract variable with the value of
the concrete variables. Here we want (leader = {a} ⇔ a_state = accepting) and the same
thing for b. We also know that if the PN signal is present in both channels then leader = ∅.
Furthermore, if one device is accepting then the other is sending (the signal PN ) and all signals
have been received. (For device a: leader = {a} ⇒ a_state = accepting ∧ b_state = sending ∧
ab = IDL ∧ b_out = IDL ∧ ba = PN ∧ a_out = PN.)
This part of the invariant is the most important, but there are more things to express. First
of all, in the initial state of the system devices are reset. With that condition all variables of
the channel from this device are equal to IDL, for device a: a_state = reset ⇒ (a_in = IDL
∧ b_out = IDL ∧ ab = IDL). When a device, for instance a, is sending then the beginning of
the channel is set to PN , for instance a_in = PN . We have the equivalence: (a_state =
sending ⇔ a_in = PN). We are also sure that if a device is reset and this device receives the
PN signal then the other must be sending. In this case, the receiving device can safely accept
to be the leader. Consider the case where the receiving device is also in the state sending:
the election is now impossible and we are in a situation of “contention”. The device discovers
this situation and sets its state to sleeping. In this state we have for device a: a_in = IDL
and b_state ∈ {sending, sleeping} (and the symmetric case for b: b_state = sleeping ⇒ b_in
= IDL ∧ b_state ∈ {sending, sleeping}). So the signal PN will be erased by IDL. After
this, each device will go back to the sending state and the previous part of the invariant is
used to describe the state. The level of modelling is quite abstract and we will see in the
final refinement many more (real-time) statements over states, especially in the situation of
contention.
Finally the case boolean variable is true if and only if: one of devices is sending and the
other is sleeping: case = TRUE ⇒ (a_state = sending ∧ b_state = sleeping) ∨ (b_state =
sending ∧ a_state = sleeping); and the device currently sending was previously in the state
sleeping: property ensure by the events.
The variable case expresses this with relations between values of case and values of other
variables. This is the key to the algorithm because when a device goes back to the state
sending after sleeping, it can elect a leader if the duration of this case is long enough. We
will see the utility of case in the last refinement. In other words, if the second device awakes a
long time after the first: then the first device has enough time to send their signal. Otherwise,
the contention reappears.
3.2 Events
Events give properties over the transitions of the system. Here we have four kinds of events:
send, pass, accept and sleep. From now on we will describe the model only from the point of
view of the device a. As the system is totally symmetrical between devices a and b, the reader
can easily fill in the blanks.
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init b= BEGIN
a_in, b_in, a_out, b_out, ab, ba :=
IDL, IDL, IDL, IDL, IDL, IDL‖
a_state, b_state := reset, reset‖
case := FALSE
END;
a_send b= WHEN
a_state = reset∧
a_out = IDL
THEN
a_state := sending‖
a_in := PN‖
ab := PN
END;
b_send b= . . .
ab_pass_out b= WHEN
ab 6= b_out∧
(b_state 6= sending ∨ b_out 6= PN)
THEN
b_out := ab‖
ab := a_in
END;
ba_pass_out b= . . .
pass_out b= WHEN
ab 6= b_out∧
ba 6= a_out
THEN
b_out := ab‖
ab := a_in‖
a_out := ba‖
ba := b_in
END;
a_accept b= REFINES accept WHEN
a_state = reset∧
a_out = PN
THEN
a_state := accepting
END;
b_accept b= . . .
a_sleep b= ANY new_ab WHERE
a_state = sending∧
a_out = PN∧
new_ab ∈ SIGNALS∧
(ab = b_out ⇒ new_ab = IDL)∧
(ab 6= b_out ⇒ new_ab = PN)
THEN
a_state := sleeping‖
a_in := IDL‖
ab := new_ab
END;
b_sleep b= . . .
a_awake_send b= WHEN
a_state = sleeping∧
a_out = IDL∧
ab = IDL∧
b_out = IDL
THEN
a_state := sending‖
a_in := PN‖
ab := PN‖
case := ¬case
END;
b_awake_send b= . . .
a_awake_accept b= REFINES accept WHEN
a_state = sleeping∧
a_out = PN∧
b_state = sending∧
ab = IDL∧
b_out = IDL
THEN
a_state := accepting‖
case := ¬case
END;
b_awake_accept b= . . .
As written with the keyword “REFINES”, four events refine the abstract event accept.
The guard of the event a_send express that a has never sent anything and is not receiving
a signal. With this condition we send a signal to the device b. The substitution: ab := PN
comes with a simplification in the use of the channel.
The ab_pass event shows how a signal progresses in the channel from a to b. We know
that (a_in 6= ab ⇒ ab 6= b_out). Therefore when there is at least one change of signal in the
channel we know that ab 6= b_out. Then we advance values from a_in to ab and from ab to
b_out. However, when there are changes of signals in both channels we can make the values
pass in both channels at the same time. This is done by the event pass_out. Without this event,
in this abstract model, one channel can take priority over the other, for example with several
activations of ab_pass_out without activations of ba_pass_out. This is not realistic behaviour,
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but in model with real-time properties this problem is solved. In the last line of the guard of
ab_pass_out we can see an expression of the priority of the event b_sleep. To express priority,
we take the guard (or a crucial part of the guard) of the event with the higher priority and put
its negation in the guard of the event with the lower priority. A part of the guard is crucial if it
negation is enought to prevent the execution of the event in any case. Hence both events can not
trigger in the same state. Without this priority the system could execute the sequence: a_send,
b_send, pass_out, a_sleep, ab_pass, a_accept. However, such a sequence is not allowed by
the standard as a device has to have discovered the contention situation. In this sequence the
device b failed to discover it (i.e. to execute b_sleep). In this refinement the problem is solved
abstractly and in later models we will use real-time constraints.
The event a_accept triggers when the situation of contention never occurred (impossible
when a state is still reset) and a device receives a signal PN .
In contrast, a device can discover a situation of contention when it is sending and it has
received a signal PN . In this case it goes to sleep and starts to remove its signal PN . This
is the only state where we can have two changes of signal in the same channel. It’s achieved
when we already have ab 6= b_out. Therefore the new state of the channel will be (a_in =
IDL ∧ ab = PN ∧ b_out = IDL).
Finally, there are two events left: a_awake_send and a_awake_accept. They contain the
same behaviour as a_send and a_accept plus the management of the variable case and some
extra conditions.
In addition to the guard of a_send, the event a_awake_send must check that the previous
signal PN of device a is erased from the channel from a to b. This can be seen in the last two
lines of the guard of a_awake_send.
In addition to the guard of a_accept, the event a_awake_accept must check that the signal
is erased in the same way. It has also to check if the device b is actually in the sending state.
Otherwise one device would accept to be the leader with the other device in state sleeping
because a_out = PN does not imply that b_state = sending; and it would lead to an
incorrect election situation.
In conclusion, this model is enough to express all behaviours abstractly and now we can
introduce the real-time.
4 Second Refinement
In this second refinement, we add a precise propagation time for the propagation of a
signal inside a channel. This constant, called prop, is in N and is not equal to zero. This
model contains three new variables: time, at_a_pass and at_b_pass. The variable time is a
global clock, the value of time represents “now” the current time. The algorithm itself does
not require a global clock or a synchronisation between devices. But in the B method we need
closed systems, i.e. we need to model the environment. The two other variables are two sets
of “Activation Time” (AT) i.e. a set of timeouts or alarms. Each AT set is linked to some
particular event. Here the set at_a_pass (respectively at_b_pass ) is linked to ab_pass_out
(ba_pass_out). Therefore, they are both linked to pass_out. The meaning is: the AT set
contains the time in the future when the linked event will be triggered. Of course, other events
can fill the AT set of another event. In a very natural way, we let the time progress in a non-
deterministic way betwen time + 1 and the first AT. If there is no AT then time progression
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is not limited. When time reaches an activation time, the linked event can be triggered and
we remove the AT from the set in the related event. With this model, we are sure that time
is progressing, and every time constraint events linked to a AT set will also be triggered at
the right moment. This model of time has already been described in our article Cansell et al.
(2007).
4.1 Invariant
The typing of the new variables are (time ∈ N) and (at_a_pass ⊆ N) and (at_b_pass ⊆
N). As the system is symmetrical we only show invariants concerning the device a. The time
can not go beyond an activation time, as we don’t want to miss the timeout of an event:
at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass 6= ∅ ⇒ time ≤ min(at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass)
As at_a_pass represents the time of the reception of a signal, and signals take the propa-
gation time prop to progress in the channel, then this AT set is bound by time + prop:
∀x·(x ∈ at_a_pass ⇒ x ≤ time + prop)
The set at_a_pass is finite and its cardinality reflects the number of signal changes travel-
ling in the channel. In the computer model we use a formula with quantification instead of a
cardinality because it is more convenient for the interactive proof.
b_in = ba ∧ ba = a_out ⇔ at_a_pass = ∅
a_in = ab ∧ ab 6= b_out ⇔ card(at_a_pass) = 1
b_in 6= ba ∧ ba 6= a_out ⇔ card(at_a_pass) = 2
A device can not start to send after the reception of a signal PN so we have:
∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_pass ∧ y ∈ at_b_pass ⇒ |x − y| < prop)
If cardinality of at_b_pass is two, then the difference of members are strictly under prop
because they are both bound by time + prop and because the pass events have higher priority
than sleep events.
∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_b_pass ∧ y ∈ at_b_pass ⇒ |x − y| < prop)
The time continues to progress after a sending and if contention is reached we have:
b_in = PN ∧ b_out = PN ⇒ time + prop /∈ at_a_pass
The events pass have higher priority than the events send:
time ∈ at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass ⇒ time + prop /∈ at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass
This part allows us to prove the refinement of the event ab_pass_out:
ab6=b_out ∧ time ∈ at_b_pass − at_a_pass ⇒ b_state6=sending ∨ b_out = IDL
4.2 Events
In this refinement we have a new event tick_tock. This event makes the time progress.
In almost all guards, we add an extra clause to model the priority between events. The main
reason for the use of priorities is the fact that the environment must act before the devices react.
Here, the environment is the three pass events, so we add time /∈ (at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass)
in guards to let pass events trigger before the other. Of course, between the three pass events,
the simultaneous passing event pass_out has higher priority. Finally, the real-time constraints
model the propagation time of signals. In the next description of events, we show only the
differences between events of the previous refinement. For that we mark new lines with a ⊕
and removed lines with a ⊖. All new lines of guards are connected with “∧” and lines of
substitution with “‖”.
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init b= BEGIN
⊕time := 0
⊕at_a_pass, at_b_pass := ∅, ∅ END;
a_send b= WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass)
THEN
⊕at_b_pass := at_b_pass∪{time+prop}
END;
b_send b= . . .
ab_pass_out b= WHEN
⊖(b_state 6= sending ∨ b_out 6= PN)
⊕time ∈ at_b_pass − at_a_pass
THEN
⊕at_b_pass := at_b_pass − {time} END;
ba_pass_out b= . . .
pass_out b= WHEN
⊕time ∈ at_a_pass ∩ at_b_pass
THEN
⊕at_a_pass := at_a_pass − {time}
⊕at_b_pass := at_b_pass − {time} END;
a_accept b= WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass)
THEN . . . END;
b_accept b= . . .
a_sleep b= WHERE
⊕time /∈ (at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass)
THEN
⊕at_b_pass := at_b_pass∪{time+prop}
END;
b_sleep b= . . .
a_awake_send b= WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass)
THEN
⊕at_b_pass := at_b_pass∪{time+prop}
END;
b_awake_send b= . . .
a_awake_accept b= WHEN
⊕time /∈ (at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass)∧
THEN . . . END;
b_awake_accept b= . . .
tick_tock b=
ANY tm WHERE
tm ∈ N ∧ tm > time∧
((at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass) 6= ∅⇒
tm ≤ min(at_a_pass ∪ at_b_pass))∧
(a_state 6= sending ∨ a_out 6= PN)∧
(b_state 6= sending ∨ b_out 6= PN)
THEN time := tm END;
5 Third Refinement
This final refinement removes all abstract conditions in the guards and adds the two dif-
ferent sleep times. As we have already explained devices try to go out of the situation of
contention by waiting a random time between a short and a long time. So we have two new
constants st (short time) and lt (long time) both in N and non-zero. Their values have the two
following properties: st ≥ prop × 2 and lt ≥ prop × 2 + st − 1. Properties are chosen in
order to leave enough time for the devices to react. The whole invariant of this paper is a proof
of that. In this refinement we have four new variables: at_a_awake, at_b_awake, a_sleept,
b_sleept. Variables a_sleept and b_sleept contain the chosen sleep time. We can see in the
Fig. 3 a timeline showing a typical situation of contention with values prop = 3, st = 6
and lt = 11. The election will succeed if devices chose two different delays between st and
lt. In that case, we can see in the Fig. 3 that the difference between the two awake times of
devices will be enough to transmit a signal. The invariant discussed in the following section
will express this formally.
5.1 Invariant
Both new AT sets at_a_awake and at_b_awake are a subset of N. Values of variables
a_sleept and b_sleept are in {st, lt}. We have the same property as in the previous invariant
about time and values of AT set: time can not go after the first timeout. The new AT sets
contain zero or one value:
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FIG. 3 – Timeline
a_state 6= sleeping ⇔ at_a_awake = ∅
a_state = sleeping ⇔ card(at_a_awake) = 1
We have a general upper bound for the new AT set and a special case:
∀x·(x ∈ at_a_awake ⇒ x ≤ time + a_sleept)
(time ∈ at_a_awake ∧ a_sleept = b_sleept⇒
∀x·(x ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ x < time + prop))
And we have several kinds of lower bound with conditions:
(a_in = PN ∧ (a_out = PN ∨ (a_out = IDL ∧ ba = PN))⇒
∀x·(x ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ time + b_sleept − prop < x))
a_in = PN ∧ a_out = PN ⇒∀x·(x ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ time + prop < x)
case = FALSE ∧ b_state = sending⇒
∀x·(x ∈ at_a_awake ⇒ time + prop < x)
(time ∈ at_a_awake ∧ a_sleept 6= b_sleept⇒
∀x·(x ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ time + prop ≤ x))
This invariant restricts the possible values of at_a_awake:
ab = PN ∧ b_out = IDL ⇒ time + prop /∈ at_a_awake
Here we can see that, in two different cases, the signal is received before awake time:
case = FALSE ⇒∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_pass ∧ y ∈ at_a_awake ⇒ x < y)
a_sleept 6= b_sleept ⇒∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_pass ∧ y ∈ at_a_awake ⇒ x ≤ y)
In the following conditions the awake time is before signal reception:
(case = TRUE ∧ a_sleept = b_sleept⇒
∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_awake ∧ y ∈ at_a_pass ⇒ x < y))
After the discovering of the contention, device a erases its signal at a propagation time
before awake time:
∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_pass ∧ y ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ x + prop ≤ y)
If chosen delays are equal, then devices do not have the time to transmit a signal:
(a_sleept = b_sleept⇒
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∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_awake ∧ y ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ |x − y| < prop))
If chosen delays are different, then devices have the time to transmit a signal. This formula
shows why this algorithm works when chosen delays are different.
(a_sleept 6= b_sleept⇒
∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_awake ∧ y ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ prop ≤ |x − y|))
If the cardinality of at_a_pass is two then we have b_sleept − prop between awake time
and the reception time of the first signal.
(b_in 6= ba ∧ ba 6= a_out⇒
∀x·(x ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ min(at_a_pass) + b_sleept − prop < x))
Finally, these formulae ensure the refinement of events a_awake_send and
a_awake_accept:
time ∈ at_a_awake ⇒ ab = IDL ∧ b_out = IDL
time ∈ at_a_awake ∧ (a_out = PN ∨ ba = PN) ⇒ b_state = sending
case = FALSE ∧ time ∈ at_a_awake ⇒ b_state = sleeping
5.2 Events
Again we show only the difference, we mark new lines with a ⊕ and removed lines with a
⊖. If an event is not present then it does not have any differences or it is symmetrical.
With the real-time properties of awake events we can remove all abstract conditions in
guard of these events. The properties, expressed with the new AT sets, ensure this requirement
as we can see in the last part of the invariant.
init b= BEGIN
⊕at_a_awake, at_b_awake := ∅, ∅
⊕a_sleept, b_sleept := st, st END;
a_sleep b=
ANY ⊕sleep
WHERE ⊕sleep ∈ {st, lt}
THEN ⊕at_a_awake :=
at_a_awake ∪ {time + sleep}
⊕a_sleept := sleep END;
a_awake_send b= WHEN
⊕time ∈ at_a_awake
⊖a_state = sleeping
⊖ab = IDL
⊖b_outs = IDL
THEN
⊕at_a_awake := at_a_awake − {time}
END;
a_awake_accept b= WHEN
⊕time ∈ at_a_awake
⊖a_state = sleeping
⊖b_state = sending
⊖ab = IDL
⊖b_out = IDL
THEN
⊕at_a_awake := at_a_awake − {time}
END;
tick_tock b= . . .
“same pattern plus at_a_awake and at_b_awake”
6 Verification by Proof and Model-checking
For us, the primary way of verification is done by mechanical proof. But we also have used
model-checking with ProB (Leuschel and Butler (2003)) in order to make partial verifications
and to find counter-examples. In order to have a finite number of transitions with our models,
we can not let the variable time increase indefinitely. Therefore, we define another version for
the event tick_tock for model-checking.
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This version of the event tick_tock lets the variable time always be zero but decreases
the values inside the AT sets. With this version, the number of transitions of the system is
finite, with a fixed value for prop. But as time always equals zero and constants are valued,
an invariant, determined to be correct with the model-checker, will not always be correct for
the proof. In any case, model-checking provides a convenient way to discover invariants and
to test them before the proof.
With the B prover the proof is cut into small “Proof Obligations” (PO). Some of those PO
are automatically discharged and some need user interactions. All proofs of the first model are
done automatically; for the first refinement 59 PO are interactive; for the second refinement
124; and for the last refinement 222. Of course all the proofs are done with the tool of the
B method. As the model is symmetrical, the proof is also symmetrical, therefore, PO comes
with a version for the device a and another similar version for the device b. Both versions are
taken into consideration inside the number of PO. The first refinement is very easy to prove,
the proofs of second and third refinement are short but numerous.
For the model-checking the first model and the second model are finite with 4 states and 24
states respectively. The next two models have only been validated with given valuations. For
the second model, with prop ∈ {1, 2, ..6} the number of states are 25, 51, 81, 117, 159 and 207.
For the last model, with (prop, st, lt) ∈ {(1, 2, 3), (2, 4, 7), (3, 6, 11), (4, 8, 15), (5, 10, 19),
(6, 12, 23)} the number of states are 54, 186, 376, 624, 930 and 1294.
The procedure of proof, with an invariant, leads to the discovery of an invariant strong
enough to be inductive. We can always start with a small invariant containing types of variables
and some requirements for the refinements of data or events. If we start to do the proof with
an invariant that is too weak then the proof will fail with an impossible interactive proof. With
this failure we see the missing piece of information about the system state: we add it to the
invariant and retry to prove.
In the case of real-time systems, we can split PO in two parts: PO coming from the event
tick_tock; and PO coming from all other events. The first kind of PO requires the invariant to
be inductive with the progression of the time. The second requires the invariant to be induc-
tive with the transitions of devices states. This leads to different kinds of proof and different
constraints over the invariant but the two invariants are dependant.
7 Related-works and Conclusion
Many of other works about IEEE Root Contention Protocol (RCP) use model-checking
over timed automata (Alur and Dill (1994)). We can find a comparative study of works about
RCP in Stoelinga (2002), this work extends thoses results by another approach. Our approach
of verification is primary focused on proof by invariant. It’s clear that an interactive proof
takes more time than verification by model-checker or proof with decision procedures. This is
the price to pay for an expressive general language based on set theory. But the tool cuts the
verification proof in small and quite easy parts. And we plan to work on the rules of the tool in
order to reduce the number of interactive steps, as the proofs show a repetitive scheme a lot of
improvements can be done. The idea of using a variable to model the time is shown in Abadi
and Lamport (1994). Here the model of time (AT sets) is different.
With our method, one can model a real-time system within the B method. The refinement
relation between models can be used in order to introduce time in a model and can be used
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again to add real-time properties step by step. If a concrete model with time refines an abstract
model we can prove the timing validity of the concrete model. At every step of refinement,
we can verify the model and its invariants by model-checking it first and then by a computer-
assisted proof. This paper shows how our pattern of refinement of real-time constraints works
on the IEEE 1394 RCP. The safety proof of RCP is done and we can see from the last invariant
how the election works when chosen delays are different:
If chosen delays are different (a_sleept 6= b_sleept), then devices have the time to transmit
a signal:
∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_awake ∧ y ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ prop ≤ |x − y|))
But if chosen delays are equal (a_sleept = b_sleept), then devices do not have enough
time:
∀(x, y)·(x ∈ at_a_awake ∧ y ∈ at_b_awake ⇒ |x − y| < prop))
Where at_a_awake and at_b_awake are sets of natural and represent the time when de-
vices will stop to wait. And prop is the propagation time needed by the signal to pass from one
device to another. Notice when devices are not in the state sleeping and do not plan to awake
then the corresponding set is empty.
Our method can be used without changes to the language of B and therefore we can extend
existing results and developments in B with real-time. As the proofs about passing of time are
particular, we could consider a way of handling this specificity. Our time is discrete but in our
proof the most important property used is the order over natural numbers. The time model used
involves a global time which interacts with a number of time of activation stored in several sets
as in a global multi-set. As the studied algorithm does not require synchronisation, the global
time is not a problem but we can think about localising this into several distributed clocks for
other case-studies.
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